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1 Introduction
As the countdown to 2015 gathers momentum,
attention has been focused on the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and the prospects for
the attainment of the key targets which were set
under each of the eight specific objectives adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly in 2001
following a set of proposals for action from the
Secretary-General of the organisation that drew
from the historic Millennium Declaration of
2000. From the outset, the MDGs attracted
considerable interest on their potentialities – or
insufficiency – in helping to overcome some of
the enduring problems of poverty, exclusion and
marginalisation that have for too long dogged the
international development experience and marred
the record of human progress. From governments,
civil society groups and the private sector to donors,
the academic community, and multilateral
institutions, there was some expectation that the
MDGs might, at last, offer a chance to humanity
to begin to redress some of the most blatant
experiences of suffering that have dented its record
of civilisation (Sumner and Tiwari 2009; Manning
2009; Ganu and Oni 2011; Green et al. 2012).
The competition among states, multilateral
agencies, sector ministries, and donors in the
implementation of the MDGs, as well as the
prospects for new forms of collaboration both
among them and between them, civil society, and
the private sector, helped sustain attention on
goals, both globally and locally.1 The imminence
of the 2015 date for attaining the objectives was
to also generate a new sense of urgency on the
efforts that need to be deployed for the
achievement of the MDG targets.
The last few years have also seen the launching
of campaigns and advocacy by different interest
groups for what they feel a post-2015 global
agenda for development might or should look
like.2 The appointment by the UN Secretary-
General of a High-Level Panel to organise global
consultations around a possible Post-2015
Development Agenda for the world was partly
meant to respond to these campaigns.3 In so
doing, effort has been invested in taking stock of
the experience with, and lessons from, the
implementation of the MDGs to date, pointing
to some of the deficits in the MDGs, including
their silences and discontents, and the ways in
which these deficits could be redressed in any
post-2015 agenda that the international
community might adopt.4
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One of the areas of discontent with the MDGs as
adopted in 2001 is what some consider as its
silence on governance, silence which is considered
to be grave by those who work at the interface of
governance and development (Ghaus-Pasha 2007;
Manning 2009).5 It is to the governance dimensions
of the MDGs that this essay addresses itself with
particular attention to the dynamics of
participation and accountability across Africa.
The basic premise of the essay is that although
the governance component of the Millennium
Declaration may not have been explicitly
incorporated into the MDGs, this has not
necessarily meant a side-tracking of governance
questions in the translation of the goals into policy.
Indeed, important governance implications flow
from the eight goals that were adopted which
merit close attention in their own right. In this
connection, it is suggested that although the
proclamation of the MDGs may have enjoyed the
support, both enthusiastic and reluctant, of a
broad admixture of development actors across
the African continent, insufficient attention was
paid to the critical importance of the context of
participation and accountability. For a variety of
reasons, these were areas of weakness which
meant that the pursuit of the goals did not
adequately feed into and/or add to the
improvement of democratic governance and,
additionally, was frequently undermined by
existing poor governance practices that have,
historically, been a bane of equitable and sustained
development in the African countries that were
among the principal targets of the initiative.
2 MDGs and their governance promises
In spite of the legitimate disputes that raged as
to whether they go far enough or even represent
a faithful translation of what some consider as
the radical Millennium Declaration into bold
actionable objectives and targets,6 it would still
be fair to suggest that the adoption of the MDGs
marked an attempt by the international
community to address some of the key challenges
which have bedevilled the global development
experience. In some ways, as a summation of
global aspirations for promoting human
progress, the MDGs could have been expected to
be positively compatible with the demands of
democratic governance, including participation
and accountability across Africa. At one level, the
key social objectives spoke to long-standing
issues of livelihood and welfare that resonated
with many. It was precisely because the MDGs,
in spite of their limitations, covered social issues
of concern that they engaged the attention of a
broad coalition of non-state actors. Coming at a
time when African countries were transiting
from authoritarian rule to elected government
under multi-party regimes, the MDGs were
expected to play a role in ensuring that the
dividends of democracy reached the generality of
the working poor – helping, thereby, to
consolidate the democratic transition that was
under way (Ganu and Oni 2011; Thisday
Newspaper 2010; AFRODAD 2005a).
At another level, in addressing a range of social
issues for which local social movements have
campaigned over a period of time, the MDGs as
a globally adopted set of objectives fed into the
long-standing quest in many countries where
properly functioning social policy systems were
not in place both for a prioritisation of social
spending and the justiciability of core social and
economic rights. Such rights are at the heart of
the social bargain in being the citizens of a given
political community. A range of social movements
and civil society groups had made these rights
the centrepiece of their campaigns for a fairer
and more equitable world order. To the extent to
which these rights are acknowledged in one form
or another by the MDGs, then the goals
themselves could be seen, as indeed some saw
them, as being relevant to the search for a new
social contract between state and society. Cast in
terms of a minimum set of attainments and
entitlements that should apply across the world
and be in place by 2015, the MDGs also appeared
to speak to the ideals of global solidarity and
citizenship which ought to make for a better-
governed international order (Ganu and Oni 2011;
Moru 2005; AFRODAD 2005a).
Furthermore, the distinct elements of
empowerment built into the MDGs appealed to a
range of activist constituencies, especially those
involved in the promotion of the rights of women
and children, and the recognition of the critical
relevance of civil society groups. Properly handled,
these elements could be expected to contribute to
the making of more active and engaged citizens,
able to exercise their agency and choice in
development and governance processes. The
methodology adopted for the implementation of
the goals provided for the monitoring of projects
by civil society groups, and in so doing offered a
potential chance for a greater engagement
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between state and society in the design and
operationalisation of interventions. The national
MDG strategies which countries were expected
to elaborate were meant to facilitate such an
engagement. The ‘multi-stakeholder’ approach
adopted at the outset of the MDGs implied a
readiness, on the face of things at least, to
embrace a mutual accountability among key
players. Mutual accountability at the national
level was to be completed by shared and mutual
accountability at the international level (UNDESA
2008; UN Millennium Project 2005).
The point should also not be forgotten that for
Africa, much of Latin America and parts of Asia,
the MDGs were adopted against the historical
backdrop of at least two decades of sustained
economic crisis which was exacerbated by the
orthodox, deflationary, and austerity-based
stabilisation and structural adjustment
programmes favoured by the IMF and the World
Bank in the name of a Washington Consensus.
These programmes exacted a huge social cost,
and pushed the working poor and marginalised
groups deeper into poverty, vulnerability, and
exclusion even as inequality grew.7 The highly
limited attempts made by the World Bank and
IMF to introduce social dimensions to mitigate
the costs of their adjustment policies made very
little difference, in part because they were half-
hearted, poorly funded, and mainly served a
public relations function, but also on account of
the refusal of the Bretton Woods institutions to
contemplate any thorough-going revision of their
deflationary model. The chorus of domestic and
international campaigns for economic reform
policies that did not target the social expenditure
of the state for wholesale retrenchment and, in
so doing, reverse some of the key gains of post-
colonial social policy, found some resonance in
the MDGs as part of the millennial determination
of the nations of the world to overcome social
failings in the international development
experience that are well within the means of
humankind to overcome. It was a sufficient
enough shift to elicit interest among campaigning
groups to engage with the MDGs, states, the UN
system and donors.8
From the point of view of many an activist, the
international character of the MDGs seemed to
offer an opportunity to better draw on the global
commitments to which governments voluntarily
adhered in order to more effectively push local
social reform agendas around which they have
been campaigning.9 Strategically, the MDGs
were seen as potentially offering an opportunity
to interface pressures for local participation and
accountability with the expectation at the global
level that governments would work towards
meeting their commitments. The specific MDG
monitoring and evaluation role accorded to civil
society in the implementation process was seen
as critical to securing both participation and
accountability. Also, the measurement of local
performance on the various MDGs and its
translation into a comparative index of sub-
regional, regional, and international performance
offered potential new opportunities for dialogue
between state and society on the social contract.10
The fact that the national MDG implementation
strategies for meeting the agreed international
targets were to be produced out of processes of
multi-stakeholder engagement and agreement,
was seen as beneficial to winning broad-based
domestic ownership underpinned by the exercise
of local policy choice.
3 The MDGs and their governance discontents
To embody a promise of strengthening
participation and accountability, and empowering
people whose exercise of citizenship has been
abridged by poverty and want is one thing. To
translate the promise into action is another. If
the democratic governance-enhancing
potentialities of the MDGs have generally failed
to materialise, it is, in part, because the
architecture for the attainment of the goals has
favoured a vertical accountability to the global at
the expense of the local, a by-product of the
attempt to transmit internationally determined
targets into the local arena mainly on the basis of
support from the donor community. Countries
across Africa, taking their cue from the incentives
flowing from this architecture, and actively aided
by agencies such as the UN Development
Programme (UNDP), have invested heavily in
pursuing implementation strategies aimed
primarily at delivering routine ‘credible’ reports
of performance to the international community,
doing so by bean-counting if necessary. Within
this parameter, the determination to ‘deliver’ on
the MDGs has tended to override participation
by and accountability to the citizens, including
elected representatives performing oversight
functions in parliament. Out of this has flowed a
depoliticisation of development experience, and
the reduction of participation and accountability
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to a series of procedural technicalities. Matters
have, of course, not been helped by the enduring
governance challenges in many African countries,
including the fact that after over two decades of
structural adjustment, they were still struggling
with problems of policy space and ownership.
It would seem evident that the robustness of
domestic national-level governance systems and
processes was always going to be critical to the
prospects for the attainment of the MDGs. One of
the earliest governance challenges that emerged
soon after the adoption of the MDGs centred on
the modalities for the ‘domestication’ of the
universal aspirations which they embodied. At one
level, there was the immediate challenge of
designing national strategies for implementation,
including the costing of projects which could be
undertaken with a view to meeting the MDG
targets. For a majority of African countries, this
task was carried out with active donor assistance
and the technical superintendence of the UNDP
which came to assume one of the most active roles
in different countries as a central animator of
the MDGs. Even civil society and parliamentary
participation in local processes connected to the
MDGs involved some degree of UNDP sponsorship
and/or facilitation.11 At another level, the question
of arrangements for financing the MDGs was
immediately posed for many African countries
and it was clear that the option that would
prevail would carry some implications for local
ownership and accountability. In the end, the
financing of the MDGs became a principal donor
domain managed either through existing
channels of support and/or the cancellation of a
proportion of bilateral and multilateral debts
authorised on the understanding that the
‘savings’ made would be dedicated to the pursuit
of the MDGs in the beneficiary countries.12
Furthermore, the quest for the ‘domestication’ of
the MDGs broached upon the issue of institutional
arrangements that were to be put in place for
their pursuit. From an administrative-institutional
point of view, were the MDGs to be carried out
by the mainstream ministries of government or
were they to be entrusted to a special MDG office
or task force that could function outside of the
regular bureaucracy? Across much of Africa, the
popular preference was for one version or the
other of the latter and governments created
special MDG units/bureaus/focal points/task
forces, sometimes strategically located in or
associated with the offices of presidents or prime
ministers, and occasionally, a Finance or
Planning ministry.13 This approach was not
entirely new as it had already been well practised
with the institutional arrangements for tackling
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and the generalised
agencification of government that was embraced
as part of the reform of the public sector.14 It was,
however, to carry some serious consequences.
For one, the interface between the line ministries
and the special agencies and offices over mandate
and role was not always obvious. For another, the
connection between the national MDG strategy
and existing or evolving national development
plans and visions were mostly ambiguous. Where
national development plans and visions had not
already been elaborated, most countries had
ongoing Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs) to which the national MDG strategies
needed to be reconciled in dialogue with donors
and institutions of the UN system.15 This
approach to the administration of public affairs
tends to weaken the mainstream institutions of
government, including line ministries, which
should ordinarily be responsible for the design
and implementation of development programmes
and interventions, whether special or not.16 The
existing institutional arrangement, complete
with its disciplines, did not therefore gain the
fullness of the opportunity which the MDGs
could have provided to strengthen internal
aptitudes and proficiency or simply renew and
update capacity. In the meantime, depending on
the learning curve of the officials in the MDG
agencies or focal point offices and special task
forces, avoidable delays, errors, and mis-steps
were registered as part of the launching of
intervention programmes and initiatives (Thisday
Newspaper 2010). Ongoing mainstream
ministerial initiatives even in domains that were
directly relevant to the MDGs, though not
necessarily carrying an MDG label, were not
automatically built upon and the pursuit of
synergies was hardly consistent or methodical. In
consequence, in spite of the paucity of resources,
efforts were sometimes needlessly duplicated.
Managing the sometimes huge resources which
the MDG programmes generated from various
donor sources also created concerns. The fact
that a high proportion of MDG funds came from
external donors meant that a considerable
amount of energy and time was spent accounting
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to them on the management of the funds received.
It also raised questions about the custody and/or
approval for the disbursement of the resources
between the special MDG offices and ministerial
departments. Furthermore, tensions over
procurement policy and the management of
contract bidding were recorded between the
MDG offices and agencies and the offices and
agencies charged with government procurement
and the enforcement of due process (ibid.). These
tensions, in turn, produced project implementation
and delivery delays that added to the costs of
MDG initiatives (Thisday Newspaper 2010;
CISLAC 2010). Perhaps inevitably, allegations of
corruption and lack of accountability were often
rife, even if evidence tended to be anecdotal.
Community and civil society participation were
also often abridged in the rush to register some
progress after lengthy delays, with the consequence
that complaints about marginalisation and lack
of transparency tended to be commonplace. The
absence of effective donor coordination did not
help matters and the burden of donor reporting
weighed heavily, and broadly to the detriment of
accountability to societal stakeholders and citizens
(AFRODAD 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b).
The attempt made in different parts of Africa to
organise consultations and promote participation
tended to be largely pro forma (IPU and UN
Millennium Campaign 2010). The modalities that
were commonly used included media briefings,
workshops and seminars, the publication of calls
for proposals for projects, briefing visits to local
communities and traditional chiefly authorities,
and public adverts and billboards on the MDGs.
These modalities may have served some limited
purposes but they hardly produced the kind of
citizen mobilisation and participation which
could allow the poor to exercise fuller agency in
the determination of interventions. In the end,
projects and programmes were initiated and
implemented top-down in contexts and on issues
where the needs to be served were enormous and
the action called for needed to be nothing less
than holistic and integrated. In spite of attempts
by such agencies as UNDP to support the
integration of the national MDG strategy into
the policy mainstream, the impression persisted
that the goals were essentially an ‘external’
affair underwritten by donors. This impression
was further reinforced by the fact that
parliaments felt themselves generally excluded
from the MDGs. Where they got involved at all,
it entailed fighting for a role and for voice (All-
Africa Parliamentary Conference on the MDGs
2012; IPU and UN Millennium Campaign 2010).
African parliaments lacked access to research on
the impact of the MDGs and the requisite
finance to enable them to play an effective
oversight role.
The governance limitations of the MDGs were
connected to the broader issue of the most
effective way to administer the development
process with a view to achieving progressive
structural transformation and delivering
incremental improvements in citizen welfare and
livelihood. The interconnections between the
MDGs and other ongoing governmental
initiatives were not properly established in part
because they tended to be disconnected from
domestic/local development planning and long-
term visioning programmes whilst being fully
integrated into global multilateral dynamics in
the terrain of development. It was an irony that
was clearly unintended but which was both
predictable and avoidable. Locally, across Africa
at least, many development actors and
commentators were to voice reminders that the
MDGs were neither a development plan nor a
substitute for one, however laudable they may
be.17 These reminders also broached upon the
long-standing question of how the countries of
Africa and the rest of the global South could
evolve a macroeconomic framework that would
be compatible with and enabling of the
attainment of the broad aspirations of their
peoples for significant social progress, especially
given the unhappy legacy of neoliberal structural
adjustment and the apparent lack of policy
choice that appeared to stymie the process of
democratisation (Mkandawire 1999). For the
problems which the MDGs were meant to help
tackle were, in part at least, the results and
legacy of a maladjustment that flowed out of the
pursuit of the Washington Consensus.
4 Looking beyond 2015
In seeking to redress the governance discontents,
omissions and failings of the MDGs, especially
with a view to a post-2015 agenda, it is important
that the existing social policies of the countries of
Africa and the broader development plans and
long-term visions within which they are embedded
are used as the principal building blocks and
pillars around which global goals and targets are
woven. Such an approach will not suffer from ex
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post facto attempts at inventing local ownership
and should curb the propensity for the needless,
capacity-dissipating, and energy-sapping
spawning of parallel bureaucratic structures for
every major new (international) initiative. In fact,
properly articulated and pursued, the approach
will carry a possibility of strengthening
institutional capacities for development
implementation. It will also help to strengthen
the institutional and social bases of
democratisation in Africa. Global norms,
standards and targets may have their place; their
domestication cannot, however, be undertaken on
the basis of a one-size-fits-all approach. The
question of ensuring that macroeconomic policy is
made to be compatible with broad social policy
objectives, local visions of long-term social
progress, and the thirst for participatory
democracies that yield dividends to the citizenry
is a prerequisite for success in the achievement of
targets for significantly improving and outrightly
transforming livelihoods. It is, additionally,
indispensable to the making of a new social
contract between state and society without which
the exercise of citizenship through active
participation and mutual accountability will only
be a formality, lacking in transformative politics.
Perhaps, in engaging the theme of governance in
its report, the High-Level Panel on a possible
post-2015 agenda may have provided a window for
a wholesale rethinking of the best ways for
ensuring that the governance dimensions of global
development objectives are structured to deliver
transformative change in the lives of the poor.
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Notes
1 The multiple and multi-layered dynamic of
competition and collaboration among the
different interests that coalesced locally and
globally around the MDGs carried specific
challenges of their own for the governance of
the development process generally and the
implementation of the MDGs more specifically. 
2 These campaigns have been carried out as
much with a view to securing – and
strengthening – some of the existing MDG
objectives as encouraging the adoption of new
ones, and in some cases pushing for bolder
targets, better/new methods of assessment of
progress, increased local ownership of the
goals, and opportunities for streamlining and
mainstreaming the objectives into a broader
and better institutionalised governance of the
development process. 
3 Concerns were expressed by some that a
disproportionately early discussion of a post-
2015 agenda might actually detract from the
pursuit of the goals and targets in the MDGs
(see Sumner and Tiwari 2010). There is no
evidence to suggest that this fear was justified
– or even any serious danger that it was likely;
the industry that has mushroomed around the
MDGs locally and globally is a vast one, with
considerable presence in the current global
development architecture. 
4 See for example, Moss (2010); Sumner and
Tiwari (2009); Manning (2009); Green et al.
(2012).
5 For many of those who regret this omission
and have been campaigning for its recognition
as a specific objective in the post-2015 period,
reference is frequently made to the fact that
the Millennium Declaration of 2000 was
explicit about governance as a key area of
interest. It is interesting that the report of the
High-Level Panel on the post-2015 MDGs
made clear references to the centrality of
governance in the quest for the eradication of
poverty and the promotion of human welfare. 
6 See Clemens et al. (2007) for some of the
concerns expressed. Easterly (2009) even
suggests that the MDGs were structured in a
way that set Africa up for failure, no matter
what. 
7 It is worth recalling here the influential public
protest against the orthodox adjustment
policies of the Bretton Woods Institutions and
its pleas for an ‘adjustment with a human face’.
8 See AFRODAD (2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b);
Igbuzor (2005). 
9 See Manning (2009) for a much deeper
reflection on this point. 
10 All of this can be asserted without prejudice to
the equally valid point which commentators
such as Moss (2010) have made about the
abuses and pitfalls of such global targets,
indicators and measurements as those built
into the MDGs and the attempts to
operationalise them. 
11 Thus it was that the UNDP supported Kenya,
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Swaziland
and Liberia, to cite a few cases, in producing
their national strategies and/or costing them.
It was also responsible for promoting the
parliamentary forum on MDGs in Uganda,
and supported civil society to press for twice-
yearly reports by the government to
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parliament on the status of the
implementation of the MDGs in Kenya. 
12 See AFRODAD (2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b). 
13 At one end of the spectrum, Nigeria, for
example, the Office of the Senior Special
Assistant to the President on the MDGs (SSAP-
MDGs) was created in 2005 with, among other
things, budgetary and funding powers. In
Ethiopia, an MDG Task Force was put in place
chaired by the Finance Minister. In Kenya, a
National MDGs Focal Point was designated and
located in the Ministry of Planning. 
14 The special, autonomous agencies, offices,
focal points, and/or task forces established in
several African countries to drive the
implementation of the MDGs and the
achievement of agreed targets were justified
on the grounds that they allowed for focus and
more efficient delivery. They were also meant
to signal the high importance which
governments attached to the MDGs.
Furthermore, they were expected to offer a
one-stop shop for resource mobilisation (from
donors), enable a coordinated design and
implementation of needed interventions, lead
the interface with relevant ministerial
departments, undertake the mobilisation of
civil society and community input and
participation, and serve as the main site for
organisation of accountability, both to donors
and to the multilateral system. 
15 Ethiopia was one of the countries that was
resolute in merging its PRSP and national
MDGs strategy into one programme (see
AFRODAD 2006a) but in several other
instances such as the Gambia, Gabon and
Guinea, this was not the approach that was
adopted.
16 South Africa was one country which did not
create any special agency or office for the
MDGs as such but even there, there was some
initial ‘confusion’ over the focal point
institution for coordinating reporting. The
Department for International Relations
initially took on that role but the report it
produced was much contested by civil society
which generated a shadow report of its own.
Statistics South Africa subsequently took
responsibility for producing the report. 
17 See AFRODAD (2006b) for example.
Olukoshi The MDGs, Empowerment and Accountability in Africa: Retrospect and Prospects20
References
AFRODAD (2006a) Linking the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper and Millennium Development Goals:
The Case of Ethiopia, Harare: African Forum
and Network on Debt and Development
AFRODAD (2006b) Linking the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper and Millennium Development Goals:
The Case of Senegal, Harare: African Forum and
Network on Debt and Development
AFRODAD (2005a) The Politics of MDGs and
Nigeria, Harare: African Forum and Network
on Debt and Development
AFRODAD (2005b) Tanzania and the Millennium
Development Goals: A Critical Appraisal of the Global
Partnership for Development (Goal 8), Harare: African
Forum and Network on Debt and Development
Akosile, Abimbola (2010) ‘Provide Structures for
People’s Participation in MDGs’, Thisday
Newspaper (Lagos and Abuja), 15 December
All-Africa Parliamentary Conference on the MDGs
(2012) ‘Accountability for Achieving the MDGs:
The Role of Parliament’, mimeo, Addis Ababa
AUC/ECA/AfDB/UNDP (2013) MDG Report 2013:
Assessing Progress in Africa Toward the Millennium
Development Goals, New York: United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP)
CISLAC (Civil Society and Legislative Advocacy
Centre) (2010) ‘Communiqué Issued at the
End of a Capacity-Building Workshop for
CSOs and CBOs on Budget Tracking on MDG
Allocations’, mimeo, Kano
Clemens, M.; Kenny, C. and Moss, T. (2007) ‘The
Trouble with the MDGs: Confronting
Expectations of Aid and Development
Success’, World Development 35.5: 735–51
Easterly, William (2009) ‘How the Millennium
Development Goals are Unfair to Africa’,
World Development 37.1: 26–35
Ganu, Josephine and Oni, Michael Abiodun (eds)
(2011) MDGs as Instruments for Development in
Africa, Singapore: Babcock and Valley View
Universities/National Library of Singapore
and Arabian Group of Journals
Ghaus-Pasha, Aisha (2007) ‘Governance for the
Millennium Development Goals: Core Issues
and Good Practices’, mimeo, United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(UNDESA)
Green, Duncan; Hale, Stephen and Lockwood,
Matthew (2012) How Can a Post-2015 Agenda
Drive Real Change?: The Political Economy of
Global Commitments, Oxfam Discussion Paper,
October
Igbuzor, Otive (2006) ‘The Millennium
Development Goals: Can Nigeria Meet the
Goals in 2015?’, mimeo, Abuja
1 ManningIntro IDSB44.5-6.qxd  26/07/2013  07:16  Page 20
Igbuzor, Otive (2005) ‘Review of the Nigerian
Millennium Development Goals 2005 Report’,
in John Moru (ed.), Another Nigeria is Possible:
Proceedings of the First Nigeria Social Forum,
Abuja: Nigeria Social Forum
IPU and the UN Millennium Campaign (2010)
Analytical Study of Parliamentary Mechanisms for
the MDGs, New York: Inter-Parliamentary
Union and UN Millennium Campaign
Manning, Richard (2009) Using Indicators to
Encourage Development: Lessons from the
Millennium Development Goals, DIIS Report
Working Paper 01, Copenhagen: Danish
Institute for International Studies
Mkandawire, Thandika (1999) ‘Crisis
Management and the Making of “Choiceless
Democracies” in Africa’, in Richard Joseph
(ed.), The State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa,
Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner
Moru, John (ed.) (2005) Another Nigeria is Possible:
Proceedings of the First Nigeria Social Forum,
Abuja: Nigeria Social Forum
Moss, Todd (2010) ‘What Next for the Millennium
Development Goals?’, Global Policy 1.2: 218–20
Sumner, Andy and Tiwari, Meera (2010) Global
Poverty Reduction to 2015 and Beyond: What has
been the Impact of the MDGs and What are the
Options for a Post-2015 Framework?, IDS Working
Paper 348, Brighton: IDS
Sumner, Andy and Tiwari, Meera (2009) After
2015: International Development Policy at a
Crossroads, London: Palgrave Macmillan
Thisday Newspaper (2010) ‘MDGs Quick Win as
Campaign Tools for 2011 Elections’, Abuja,
11 July
UN Millennium Project (2005) Investing in
Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the
Millennium Development Goals – An Overview,
New York: United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP)
UNDESA (2008) Participatory Governance and the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), New
York: UN Department of Economic and Social
Affairs
IDS Bulletin Volume 44  Number 5–6  September 2013 21
1 ManningIntro IDSB44.5-6.qxd  26/07/2013  07:16  Page 21
